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Abstract
We introduce a general theory of functions called Flow. We prove ZF,
non-well founded ZF and ZFC can be immersed within Flow as a natural
consequence from our framework. The existence of strongly inaccessible
cardinals is entailed from our axioms. And our first important application
is the introduction of a model of Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory where the
Partition Principle (PP) holds but not the Axiom of Choice (AC). So,
Flow allows us to answer to the oldest open problem in set theory: if PP
entails AC.
This is a full preprint to stimulate criticisms before we submit
a final version for publication in a peer-reviewed journal.
1 Introduction
It is rather difficult to determine when functions were born, since mathematics
itself changes along history. Specially nowadays we find different formal concepts
associated to the label function. But an educated guess could point towards
Sharaf al-Dı¯n al-Tu¯s¯ı who, in the 12th century, not only introduced a ‘dynamical’
concept which could be interpreted as some notion of function, but also studied
how to determine the maxima of such functions [11].
All usual mathematical approaches for physical theories are based on ei-
ther differential equations or systems of differential equations whose solutions
(when they exist) are either functions or classes of functions (see, e.g., [26]).
In pure mathematics the situation is no different. Continuous functions, lin-
ear transformations, homomorphisms, and homeomorphisms, for example, play
a fundamental role in topology, linear algebra, group theory, and differential
geometry, respectively. Category theory [19] emphasizes such a role in a very
clear, elegant, and comprehensive way. As remarked by Marquis [20], category
theory allows us to distinguish between canonical and noncanonical maps, in a
way which is not usually achieved within purely extensional set theories, like
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ZFC. And canonical maps “constitute the highway system of mathematical con-
cepts”. Concepts of symmetry are essential in pure and applied mathematics,
and they are stated by means of group transformations [29].
Some authors suggest that functions are supposed to play a strategic role
into the foundations of mathematics [31] and even mathematics teaching [15],
rather than sets. The irony of such perspective lies in the historical roots of
set theories. Georg Cantor’s seminal works on sets were strongly motivated by
Bernard Bolzano’s manuscripts on infinite multitudes called Menge [30]. Those
collections were supposed to be conceived in a way such that the arrangement
of their components is unimportant. However, Bolzano insisted on an Euclidian
view that the whole should be greater than a part, while Cantor proposed a
quite different approach: to compare infinite quantities we should consider a
one-to-one correspondence between collections. Cantor’s concept of collection
(in his famous Mengenlehre) was strongly committed to the idea of function.
Subsequent formalizations of Cantor’s “theory” were developed in a way such
that all strategic terms were associated to an intended interpretation of collec-
tion. The result of that effort is a strange phenomenon from the point of view of
theories of definition: Padoa’s principle allows us to show domains of functions
are definable from functions themselves [4] [5] [24]. Thus, even in extensional
set theories functions seem to play a more fundamental role than sets.
Sets can be intuitively viewed as the result of a process of collecting ob-
jects. An object is collected if it is assigned to a given set. But the fundamental
mechanism here is to attribute something to a certain collection, a process which
resembles the role a function is supposed to perform. From another point of
view, we should recall that sets and functions are meant to correspond to an
intuitive notion of properties. Usually properties allow to define either classes or
sets (like the Separation Schema in ZFC). But another possibility is that prop-
erties correspond to functions. Talking about objects that have a given property
P corresponds to associate certain objects to a label which represents P ; and
any other remaining objects are supposed to be associated to a different label.
The correspondence itself between P and a given label does have a functional,
rather than a set-theoretical, appeal. And usually, those labels are called sets.
So, why do we need sets? Why can’t we deal primarily with functions? In other
words, why can’t we label those intended properties with functions instead of
sets?
Another issue with extensional set theories like ZFC and NBG is the fact that
usually sets are solely ‘generated’ from a hierarchical procedure characterized
by postulates like ‘pair’, ‘power’, ‘replacement’, and ‘union’. Few exceptions
are axioms like ‘choice’ and ‘separation’. But even those last cases depend on
the former ones to work. That character of standard set theories generates a
lot of discussions regarding independent formulas like those which guarantee
the existence of (even weakly) inaccessible cardinals. Thus, if someone intends
to make category theory work within a ZF-style set theory, it is necessary to
postulate an independent formula which guarantees the existence of some sort
of universe, like Grothendieck’s [18] or hierarchies of constructible sets [13].
It could be thought that category theory itself provides a framework to
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develop this sort of functional approach we intend to investigate. Category
theory deals primarily with morphisms [19] which are commonly associated to
some notion of function (at least in a vast amount of applications). For example,
the category of topological spaces, whose objects are topological spaces, may
have their morphisms described as homotopy classes of continuous maps, and
not functions. But even in that case the concept of function (map) is somehow
present.
However, even morphisms, functors, and natural transformations have do-
mains and codomains, and so we still wouldn’t have the appropriate framework
to develop what we have in mind. That happens because Category Theory
seems to be somehow historically committed to some sort of set-theoretic intu-
ition about what a function is supposed to be: an ‘agent’ which is supposed to
‘act’ on objects which inhabit some stage commonly understood as a collection.
Such a stage is usually referred to as a domain. And we want to investigate the
possibility of getting rid of domains. In other words, we are pursuing a purely
functional formal framework where collections truly play a secondary role.
String diagrams [7] (whose edges and vertices can eventually be interpreted
as morphisms in a monoidal category) introduce some ideas which seem to inter-
sect with our own. A remarkable feature of string diagrams is that edges need
not be connected to vertices at both ends. More than that, unconnected ends
can be interpreted as inputs and outputs of a string diagram (with important
applications in computer science). But within our framework no function has
any domain whatsoever. Besides, the usual way to cope with string diagrams is
by means of a discrete and finitary framework, while in Flow (our framework)
we have no need for such restrictions.
A more radical proposal for mathematical foundations where functions play
a fundamental role is the Theory of Autocategories [8]. Autocategories are
developed with the aid of autographs, where arrows (which work as morphisms)
are drawn between arrows with no need for objects. And once more we see
a powerful idea concerning functions is naturally emerging in different places
nowadays.
This paper is motivated by von Neumann’s original ideas [31] and a varia-
tion of them [24], and related papers as well ([4] [5]). In [24] it was provided a
reformulation of von Neumann’s ‘functions’ theory (termed N theory). Never-
theless, we develop here a whole new approach. We close this Introduction with
our main ideas from an intuitive point of view, including our main contribution.
Locutions like “postulate” and “axiom” are used interchangeably, as synonyms.
Flow is a first order theory with equality, where the intended interpretation
of its terms is that of a monadic function. All terms are called functions . Our
framework has one primitive concept (besides equality): a functional letter f21
where f21 (f, x) = y is abbreviated as y = f(x). We call y the image of x by f .
Every f has a unique image f(t) for any t. Thus, our functions have no
domain whatsoever, although we are able to define concepts like domain and
range. Besides, there are two special functions: 0 and 1. For any t we have
0(t) = 0 and 1(t) = t. So, for all that matters, 1 behaves like an identity
function and 0 works as a null function.
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A Self-Reference Axiom says f(f) = f , for any f . Any functions f and
g which share the same images f(t) and g(t), for any t, are the same. That
is provable as a consequence from a Weak Extensionality Axiom and our self-
reference postulate.
If t 6= f and f(t) 6= 0, we say f acts on t and denote this by f [t]. No f
acts on itself, according to the self-reference axiom. We use this concept for
defining a membership relation: t ∈ f iff f [t] and some conditions are imposed
for both f and t. In this sense, our self-reference axiom works as very weak
form of regularity, since it entails there is no f such that f ∈ f .
For any f and g there is a binary F-composition f ◦ g (which is associative
only on a portion of the universe of discourse of Flow), such that (f ◦ g)(t) =
f(g(t)), except when t = f ◦g, t = f and t = g. If f ◦g 6= f , then (f ◦g)(f) = 0;
and the same happens to f ◦ g 6= g. Thus, F-composition does not rely on
any consideration regarding domains or codomains of the functions to be F-
composed. Due to the self-reference postulate, (f ◦ g)(f ◦ g) = f ◦ g.
The F-successor σ(f) (abbreviated as σf ) of an f is supposed to be a function
g which shares the same images of f for any t 6= g, in a way such that f 6= g.
If there is no g like that, then σf is simply 0, except for the cases when f is
either σ itself (due to self-reference) or 0 (since there is a theorem which states
f(0) = 0 for any f). In those cases, σσ = σ and σ0 = 0, where σ itself is a
function.
There is a function ϕ0 which is identifiable to the empty set of extensional
set theories in a very precise manner. Its existence is granted by F-composition.
ϕ0 and 0 are the only functions who do not act on any term, although ϕ0 6= 0.
Besides, σϕ0 = ϕ1, where ϕ1 is identifiable to the unitary set whose only member
is the empty set; σϕ1 = ϕ2; and so on. Those ϕn are our first ordinals.
A restriction g of a given f is such that for any t, if g[t], then f [t] and
g(t) = f(t). Restrictions may be definable (but not always) from an axiom which
resembles the Separation Scheme of ZFC. Many restrictions g of a given function
f are supposed to be determined under the influence of a formula F : the values
g(t) depend on the values f(t) and whether or not we have F (t). The existence
of such restrictions depends on considerations regarding two different kinds of
functions: those who act on ‘many’ terms and those who do not. Functions
who act on ‘many’ terms are called comprehensive (some of them correspond to
the usual notion of a proper class). A function f is comprehensive iff there is a
restriction g of f such that σg = 0 and g 6= 0. The remaining functions are called
uncomprehensive. We denote g as f
∣∣
F
. When f is uncomprehensive, there are
no constraints whatsoever for determining g. But when f is comprehensive, we
should be very careful. In that case, we demand formula F be such that, for
any t, F (t) entails t is uncomprehensive. But even with such a constraint, we
are still able to define uncomprehensive functions which act on comprehensive
terms. That allows us to define a Grothendieck Universe.
A term g lurks f iff: ∀x(g[x] ⇒ f [x]), or x = f(t) for some t and either
f [g(x)] or g(x) = f(t) for some t. That concept generalizes the usual notion of
subset.
The full power of any uncomprehensive function f is the uncomprehensive
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function p(f) which acts on every possible g that lurks f . For example, if f
acts on just two distinct terms x and y, such that f(x) = x and f(y) = y,
then p(f) acts on the next functions: f1, f2, f3, f4, f5, f6, f7, f8, and f9,
where: f1(x) = x, f1(y) = y; f2(x) = x, f2(y) = x; f3(x) = y, f3(y) = y;
f4(x) = y, f4(y) = x; f5(x) = y, f5(y) = 0; f6(y) = x, f6(x) = 0; f7(x) = x,
f7(y) = 0; f8(y) = y, f8(x) = 0; f9 = ϕ0. Thus, p(f) unavoidably acts on f
(here represented by f1) and ϕ0. We show this is a significant generalization
of the concept of power set. Both full power and the usual notion of power set
(called here restricted power) are definable within our framework. Actually, that
is one of the methodological and epistemological advantages of Flow for solving
the problem of Partition Principle (PP) versus Axiom of Choice (AC). More
than that, Flow allows us to introduce models of ZF with AC or its negation,
with the Axiom of Regularity or its negation, among other possibilities. On the
other hand, our framework is not supposed to be simply one more technique for
creating models of ZF besides those already stated in the literature [1] [6] [13]
[14] [28]. Our main purpose is to introduce and develop this general theory of
functions with merits by its own.
Creation Axiom helps to build functions which are no restrictions of 1. Al-
though we do not need the concepts of domain and range of a function, those
are easily definable. Thus we are able to translate the concepts of injective and
surjective functions within our framework.
Finally, a F-Choice Postulate grants the existence of a quite useful injection
g that lurks any surjection f . That postulate entails PP but not AC. Thus,
Flow is used to build a model where both PP and the negation of AC hold.
When Ernst Zermelo introduced AC, his motivation was the Partition Prin-
ciple [2]. Indeed, AC entails PP. But since 1904 (when Zermelo introduced AC)
it is unknown whether PP implies AC. Our answer to that question is negative,
thanks to Theorems 42 and 55. Our point is that ZF, ZFC, all their variants,
and almost all their respective models (with a few exceptions like those in [1] and
[6]) are somehow committed to a methodological and epistemological character
which forces us to see sets as collections of some sort. Within Flow that does not
happen, since our framework drives us to see sets as special cases of functions.
All sets in Flow are restrictions of 1. Nevertheless, functions who are no restric-
tions of 1 play an important role with consequences over sets. An analogous
situation takes place with the well known Reflexion Principle in model theory
[28]: some features of the von Neumann Universe motivate mathematicians to
look for new axioms which grant the existence of strongly inaccessible cardinals.
Flow, however, provides a new way for coping with the metamathematics of ZF.
2 Flow theory
Flow is a first-order theory F with identity [21], where x = y reads “x is equal
to y”, and ¬(x = y) is abbreviated as x 6= y. Flow has one functional letter
f21 (termed evaluation), where f
2
1 (f, x) is a term, if f and x are terms. If
y = f21 (f, x), we abbreviate this by f(x) = y, and read “y is the image of
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x by f”. All terms are called functions . Such a terminology seems to be
adequate under the light of our intended interpretation: functions are supposed
to be terms which ‘transform’ terms into other terms. Since we are assuming
identity, our functions cannot play the role of non-trivial relations. Suppose, for
example, f(x) = y and f(x) = y′, which are abbreviations for f21 (f, x) = y and
f21 (f, x) = y
′, respectively. From transitivity of identity, we have y = y′. So, for
any f and any x, there is one single y such that f(x) = y.
Lowercase Latin and Greek letters denote functions, with the sole exception
of two specific functions to appear in the next pages, namely, 0 and 1. Uppercase
Latin letters are used to denote formulas or predicates (which are eventually
defined). Any explicit definition in Flow is an abbreviative one, in the sense that
for a given formula F , the definiendum is a metalinguistic abbreviation for the
definiens given by F . Eventually we use bounded quantifiers. If P is a predicate
defined by a formula F , we abbreviate ∀x(P (x) ⇒ G(x)) and ∃x(P (x) ∧G(x))
as ∀Px(G(x)) and ∃Px(G(x)), respectively; where G is a formula. Finally,
∃!x(G(x)) is a metalinguistic abbreviation for ∃x∀y(G(y)⇔ y = x).
Postulates F1∼F11 of F are as follows.
F1 - Weak Extensionality ∀f∀g(((f(g) = f∧g(f) = g)∨(f(g) = g∧g(f) =
f))⇒ f = g)).
If f(g) = f we say f is rigid with g. If f(g) = g we say f is flexible with g.
If both f and g are rigid (flexible) with each other, then f = g.
F2 - Self-Reference ∀f(f(f) = f).
Any f is flexible and rigid with itself. That may sound a strong limitation.
But that feature is quite useful for our purposes.
Observation 1 Let y be a function such that ∀x(y(x) = r ⇔ x(x) 6= r). What
about y(y)? If x = y, then y(y) = r ⇔ y(y) 6= r (Russell’s paradox). But
that entails y(y) 6= y(y), another contradiction. However, our Self-Reference
postulate does not allow us to define such an y, since x(x) = x for any x. That
is not the only way to avoid such an inconsistency. Our Restriction axiom
(some pages below) does the same work. That opens the possibility of variations
of Flow where Self-Reference does not hold.
Our first theorem states any f can be identified by its images f(x).
Theorem 1 ∀f∀g(f = g ⇔ ∀x(f(x) = g(x))).
Proof From substitutivity of identity in f(x) = f(x), proof of the ⇒ part
is straightforward: if f = g, then f(x) = g(x), for any x. For the ⇐
part, suppose, for any x, f(x) = g(x). If x = f , f(f) = g(f); if x = g,
f(g) = g(g). From F2, f(f) = f and g(g) = g. So, g(f) = f and f(g) = g.
F1 entails f = g.
Axioms F1 and F2 could be rewritten as one single formula:
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F1’ - Alternative Weak Extensionality ∀f∀g(((f(g) = f ∧ g(f) = g) ∨
(f(g) = g ∧ g(f) = f))⇔ f = g)).
F2 is a consequence from F1’. Ultimately, f = g entails f(g) = f (from
F1’). And substitutivity of identity entails f(f) = f . But we prefer to keep
axioms F1 and F2 (instead of F1’) to smooth away some discussions. From F1
and F2, we can analogously see that F1’ is a nontrivial theorem.
F3 - Identity ∃f∀x(f(x) = x).
There is at least one f such that, for any x, we have f(x) = x. Any function
f which satisfies F3 is said to be an identity function.
Theorem 2 Identity function is unique.
Proof Suppose both f and g satisfy F3. Then, for any x, f(x) = x and
g(x) = x. Thus, f(g) = g and g(f) = f . Hence, according to F1, f = g.
In other words, there is one single f which is flexible to every term. In
that case we simply say f is flexible. That means “flexible” and “identity” are
synonyms.
F4 - Rigidness ∃f∀x(f(x) = f).
There is at least one f which is rigid with any function. Observe the sym-
metry between F3 and F4! Any f which satisfies last postulate is said to be
rigid .
Theorem 3 The rigid function is unique.
Proof Let f and g satisfy axiom F4. Then, for any x, f(x) = f and g(x) = g.
Thus, f(g(x)) = f(g) = f and g(f(x)) = g(f) = g. From F1, f = g.
Now we are able to introduce new terminology. Term 1 is the identity (flexi-
ble) function, while 0 is the rigid function, since we proved they are both unique.
So,
∀x(1(x) = x ∧ 0(x) = 0).
Since f(x) = y says f21 (f, x) = y, F3 states there is an f such that, for any x,
f21 (f, x) = x, while F4 says there is f where f
2
1 (f, x) = f . If we do not grant
the existence of other functions, it seems rather difficult to prove 0 6= 1.
Theorem 4 0 is the only function which is rigid with 0.
Proof This theorem says ∀x(x 6= 0 ⇒ x(0) 6= x), i.e., ∀x(x(0) = x ⇒ x = 0).
But 0(x) = 0. So, if x(0) = x ∧ 0(x) = 0, then x = 0 (F1).
Theorem 5 1 is the only function which is flexible with 1.
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Proof This theorem says ∀x(x 6= 1 ⇒ x(1) 6= 1), i.e., ∀x(x(1) = 1 ⇒ x = 1).
But 1(x) = x. So, if x(1) = 1 ∧ 1(x) = x, then x = 1 (F1).
For more details about x(0) and x(1), for any x, see Theorems 10 and 13.
Definition 1 Given f and g, the F-composition h = f ◦ g, if it exists, must
satisfy the next conditions:
(i) h 6= 0; (ii) ∀x((x 6= f ∧ x 6= g ∧ x 6= h)⇒ h(x) = f(g(x)));
(iii) h 6= f ⇒ h(f) = 0; (iv) h 6= g ⇒ h(g) = 0;
(v) (g 6= h ∧ f 6= h ∧ g 6= 1 ∧ f 6= 1)⇒ (f(g(h)) = 0 ∨ g(h) = 0)
So, (i) No F-composition is 0. (ii) F-composition behaves like standard
notions of composition between functions up to self-reference. Nevertheless,
contrary to usual practice in standard set theories, we can define F-composition
between any two functions. (iii and iv) No F-composition acts on any of its
factors. Finally, item (v) is a technical constraint to avoid ambiguities in the
calculation of f ◦ g. Either g does not act on the F-composition h or, if it acts,
then f does not act on g(h).
F5 - F-Composition ∀f∀g∃!h(h = f ◦ g).
We never calculate (f ◦ g)(f ◦ g) as f(g(f ◦ g)), since (f ◦ g)(f ◦ g) is f ◦ g,
according to F2. Given f and g, we can ‘build’ f ◦ g through a three-step
process: (i) First we establish a label h for f ◦ g; (ii) Next we evaluate f(g(x))
for any x which is different of f and g. By doing that we are assuming those
x are different of h. Thus, if such a choice of x entails f(g(x)) = y for a given
y, then h(x) = y; (iii) Next we evaluate the following possibilities: is h equal
to either f , g or something else? If h 6= g, then h(g) is supposed to be 0. If
h(g) = 0 entails a contradiction, then h is simply g. An analogous method is
used for assessing if h is f . Eventually, h is neither f nor g, as we can see in
the next theorems.
Theorem 6 There is a unique h such that h 6= 0 but h(x) = 0 for any x 6= h.
Proof From Definition 1 and F5, 0 ◦ 0 is a unique h 6= 0 such that, for any x
where x 6= 0 and x 6= h, h(x) = 0(0(x)) = 0(0) = 0. Since h 6= 0, then F5
entails h(0) = 0. Thus, h(x) is 0 for any x 6= h, while h itself is different
of 0.
Such h of last theorem (which does not conflict neither with Theorem 3 nor
with Theorem 4) is labeled with a special symbol, namely, ϕ0. So, 0 ◦ 0 = ϕ0,
where ϕ0 6= 0. If the reader is intrigued by the subscript 0 in ϕ0, our answer is
‘yes, we intend to introduce ordinals, where ϕ0 is the first one’.
Let f , g, a, and c be pairwise distinct functions where: (i)f(a) = g, f(g) = c,
f(c) = c, f(f) = f , and f(r) = 0 for the remaining values r; (ii) g(a) = a,
g(g) = g, and g(r) = 0 for the remaining values r; (iii) a and c are arbitrary,
as long they are neither 0 nor 1. Then, (f ◦ g) ◦ f = ϕ0, while f ◦ (g ◦ f) = l,
where l(a) = c, l(l) = l, and l(r) = 0 for the remaining values r. Thus,
F-composition among functions which act on each other, if they exist, is not
necessarily associative.
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Theorem 7 Let f , g, and h be terms such that neither one of them acts on the
remaining ones. Then F-Composition is associative among f , g, and h.
Proof Both f ◦ (g ◦ h) = p and (f ◦ g) ◦ h = q correspond (Definition 1) to
y = f(g(h(x))), if x is different of f , g, h, p, and q. So, f◦(g◦h) = (f◦g)◦h
for those values of x. But f , g, and h do not act on f , g, or h; and no
F-composition acts on any of its factors. So, f ◦ (g ◦ h) = (f ◦ g) ◦ h =
f(g(h(x))).
Evaluation f21 is not associative as well. Consider, e.g., x(1(x)), for x dif-
ferent of 0 and different of 1, and such that x(1) = 0 (functions like that do
exist, as we can see later on). Thus, x(1(x)) = x(x) = x. If evaluation was
associative, we would have x(1(x)) = x(1)(x) = 0(x) = 0; a contradiction, since
we assumed x 6= 0! Of course this rationale works only if we prove the existence
of a function like x and that 0 6= 1. Both claims are the subject of the next two
theorems.
It is good news that evaluation is not associative. According to F2, for all
t, g(t) = (g(g))(t), since g(g) = g. If evaluation was associative, we would have
g(t) = g(g(t)) and, thus, g = g ◦ g. So, F-composition would be idempotent.
Theorem 8 0 6= 1.
Proof 0 ◦ 0 = ϕ0 6= 0 (Theorem 6). But 0(ϕ0) = 0, while 1(ϕ0) = ϕ0. Thus,
from Theorem 1, 0 6= 1.
Theorem 9 For any x we have 0 ◦ x = x ◦ 0 = ϕ0
Proof First we prove 0 ◦ x = ϕ0. From Definition 1 and axiom F5, (0 ◦x)(t) =
0(x(t)) = 0 for any t 6= 0 and t 6= x. But F5 demands 0 ◦ x is different
of 0. Hence, (0 ◦ x)(0) = 0. Regarding x, there are three possibilities: (i)
x = 0; (ii) x = ϕ0; (iii) x is neither 0 nor ϕ0. The first case corresponds to
Theorem 6, which entails 0◦x = ϕ0. In the second case, if 0◦x is different
of x = ϕ0, then (0 ◦ x)(ϕ0) = 0. But that would entail (0 ◦ x)(t) = 0 for
any t 6= 0◦x, which corresponds exactly to function ϕ0 proven in Theorem
6, a contradiction. So, 0 ◦ x is indeed ϕ0, when x = ϕ0. Concerning last
case, since x 6= 0 and x 6= ϕ0, then (Theorem 1) there is t 6= ϕ0 such that
x(t) 6= 0 for x 6= t. From F5, (0 ◦ x)(t) = 0 for such value of t. But once
again we have a function 0◦x such that (0◦x)(t) = 0 for any t 6= 0, which
corresponds to ϕ0 from Theorem 6. Concerning the identity x ◦ 0 = ϕ0,
the proof is analogous. If h = x ◦ 0, then h 6= 0 (from F5). Besides, for
any x, x 6= h entails h(x) = 0. Hence, h = ϕ0.
Theorem 10 ∀x(x(0) = 0).
Proof x ◦ 0 = ϕ0 (Theorem 9). Hence, for any t, (t 6= x ∧ t 6= 0 ∧ t 6= ϕ0) ⇒
ϕ0(t) = x(0(t)) = x(0). But ϕ0(t) = 0 for any t 6= ϕ0. Thus, x(0) = 0.
Theorem 11 1 ◦ 1 = 1.
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Proof From F5, h = 1 ◦ 1 entails h(x) = x for any x 6= 1. Since the F-
composition is unique and 1 guarantees all demanded conditions, then
h = 1.
Theorem 12 ∀x∀y(x ◦ y = 1⇒ (x = 1 ∧ y = 1)).
Proof Let x 6= 1. Then 1(x) = 0, according to F5. But that happens only for
x = 0. And 0 ◦ y 6= 1. Analogous argument holds for y 6= 1.
There can be no functions different of 1 such that their composition is 1.
Next theorem is important for a better understanding about F1, although
its proof does not demand the use of such a postulate.
Theorem 13 ∀x((x 6= 0 ∧ x(1) = 0)⇔ (1 ◦ x = x ∧ x ◦ 1 = x ∧ x 6= 1)).
Proof The ⇒ part. If x(1) = 0, then x 6= 1, since 1(1) = 1. If x ◦ 1 = h, then,
for any t different of x, 1, and h, we have h(t) = x(1(t)) = x(t). If h = x,
then h satisfies all conditions from F5, since x 6= 1, h(1) = x(1) = 0,
and h(t) = x(t) for any t 6= h. Since F5 demands h to be unique, then
h = x. If 1 ◦ x = h, we use an analogous argument. For the ⇐ part,
1 ◦ x = x ◦ 1 = x entails x 6= 0 (Theorem 9). Since x 6= 1, then F5
demands for the F-composition x that x(1) = 0.
Observation 2 If it wasn’t for the uniqueness of F-compositions in F5, Flow
would be consistent with the existence of many functions, like x and h (from
Theorem 13), which “do” the same thing. We refer to such functions as clones.
For a brief investigation about clones see Definition 13 and its subsequent dis-
cussion. Clones are meant to be different functions x and h which share the
same images x(t) and h(t) for any t different of both x and h, and such that
x(h) = 0 and h(x) = 0. From Theorem 1, x 6= h (recall F2). We use this
opportunity to prove Theorem 6, since 0 ◦ 0 = ϕ0, where ϕ0 and 0 are clones.
But we cease using clones when we talk about other functions. That is why we
refer to F1 as “weak extensionality”. A strong extensionality postulate would
demand that other clones besides 0 and ϕ0 cannot exist. We do something like
that in some remaining postulates where we use the quantifier ∃!.
Another issue concerning F-composition is its non-associativity. The way
we introduced ‘composition’ is not the only one possible. We discuss about that
at the end of this paper.
Definition 2 Given a term f , g is the F-successor of f , and we denote this by
Σ(f, g), iff f(g) = 0 ∧ ∀x(x 6= g ⇒ g(x) = f(x)).
For example, let f by given by f(a) = b, f(b) = c, f(c) = c, f(f) = f , and
f(r) = 0 for the remaining values r. Now let g be given by g(a) = b, g(b) = c,
g(c) = c, g(f) = f , g(g) = g, and g(r) = 0 for the remaining values r, where
g 6= f . In that case, Σ(f, g), if functions like those exist. Observe this has
nothing to do with our previous discussion about clones.
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F6 - F-Successor Function ∃!σ(σ 6= 0 ∧ ∀f((f 6= σ ∧ f 6= 0)⇒
(∃g(Σ(f, g)⇔ σ(f) = g) ∨ (∀h(¬Σ(f, h))⇔ σ(f) = 0)))).
This last axiom states the existence and uniqueness of a special function σ.
From now on we write mostly σf for σ(f). Every time we use the symbol σ we
are referring to the same term from F6: the only one such that σf = g 6= 0
is equivalent to Σ(f, g), and σf = 0 is equivalent to ∀h(¬Σ(f, h)), as long f is
neither σ nor 0. Thus, σ successfully ‘signals’ F-successors, when they exist, for
all functions, except when f is either 0 or σ. In those cases, we have Σ(0, ϕ0)
and σ0 = 0 (Theorem 10), while ∀h(¬Σ(σ, h)) and σσ = σ (F2).
Next we want to grant the existence of F-successors for many other terms.
As previously announced, this axiom states the existence of an hierarchy of
functions, where ϕ0 is the first one.
F7 - Infinity ∃i((∀t(i(t) = t ∨ i(t) = 0)) ∧ σi 6= 0 ∧ (i(ϕ0) = ϕ0 ∧ ∀x((x 6=
0 ∧ i(x) = x)⇒ (i(σx) = σx ∧ σx 6= 0)))).
Definition 3 Any i which satisfies F7 is said to be inductive.
Since the existence of ϕ0 is granted by F5, we can use σ to justify the exis-
tence of ϕ1 = σϕ0 such that ϕ1(ϕ1) = ϕ1, ϕ1(ϕ0) = ϕ0, and for the remaining
values r (those who are neither ϕ0 nor ϕ1) we have ϕ1(r) = 0. That happens
because F7 states the existence of at least one other function i and infinitely
many other functions. It says i(ϕ0) = ϕ0. Besides, there is a non-0 F-successor
of ϕ0 such that i(σϕ0) = σϕ0 . More than that, if x admits a non-0 F-successor σx
(where i(x) = x), then i(σx) = σx, where σx 6= 0. Thus, ϕ0 6= 0 and σϕ0 = ϕ1,
where ϕ1 6= ϕ0 and ϕ1 6= 0. Analogously we can get ϕ2, ϕ3, and so on. Along
with those terms ϕn, F7 says any inductive function i admits its own non-0
F-successor σi.
Subscripts 0, 1, 2, 3, etc., are metalinguistic symbols based on an alphabet of
ten symbols (the usual decimal numeral system) which follows the lexicographic
order ≺, where 0 ≺ 1 ≺ 2 · · · ≺ 8 ≺ 9. If n is a subscript, then n+1 corresponds
to the next subscript, in accordance to the lexicographic order. In that case,
we write n ≺ n + 1. n +m is an abbreviation for (...(...((n + 1) + 1) + ...1)...)
with m occurrences of + and m occurrences of pairs of parentheses. Again we
have n ≺ n+m. Besides, ≺ is a strict total order. That fact allows us to talk
about a minimum value between subscripts m and n: min{m,n} is m iff m ≺ n,
it is n iff n ≺ m, and it is either one of them if m = n. Of course, m = n iff
¬(m ≺ n) ∧ ¬(n ≺ m). If m ≺ n ∨m = n, we denote this by m  n. Such a
vocabulary of ten symbols endowed with ≺ is called here (meta) language L.
F7 provides us some sort of “recursive definition” for functions ϕn, while it
allows as well to guarantee the existence of inductive functions: (i) ϕ0 is such
that ϕ0(x) is ϕ0 if x = ϕ0 and 0 otherwise; (ii) ϕn+1 is such that ϕn+1(ϕn+1) =
ϕn+1, ϕn+1 6= ϕn, and ϕn+1(x) = ϕn(x) for any x different of ϕn+1.
Observe that ϕn+1(ϕn) = ϕn(ϕn) = ϕn, while ϕn(ϕn+1) = 0. Moreover,
ϕn+2(ϕn+1) = ϕn+1, and ϕn+2(ϕn) = ϕn+1(ϕn) = ϕn; while ϕn(ϕn+2) = 0.
11
Figure 1 illustrates how to represent some functions f in a quite intuitive
way. A diagram of f is formed by a rectangle. On the left top corner inside
the rectangle we find label f . The remaining labels refer to terms x such that
either f(x) 6= 0 or there is t such that f(t) = x. For each x inside the rectangle
there is a unique corresponding arrow which indicates the image of x by f , as
long x is not f itself. Due to self-reference, label f at the left top corner inside
the rectangle does not need to be attached to any arrow.
From left to right, the first diagram refers to ϕ0. It says, for any x, ϕ0(x) is
0, except for ϕ0 itself. The second diagram says ϕ1(ϕ1) = ϕ1, and ϕ1(ϕ0) = ϕ0.
The circular arrow associated to ϕ0 in the second diagram says ϕ1(ϕ0) = ϕ0.
Self-reference postulate does not need to be represented in diagrams. The third
diagram says ϕ2(ϕ2) = ϕ2, ϕ2(ϕ1) = ϕ1, and ϕ2(ϕ0) = ϕ0. Finally, for the
sake of illustration, the last diagram corresponds to an f such that f(a) = b,
f(b) = c, and f(c) = 0. That is why there is no arrow ‘starting’ at c. In those
cases we represent c outside the rectangle. The existence of functions like that
is granted by F10α. The diagrams of 0 and 1 are, respectively, a blank rect-
angle and a filled in black rectangle. Other examples are provided in the next
paragraphs.
ϕ0 ϕ1
x
ϕ0
ϕ2
x
ϕ0
x
ϕ1
· · ·
f
a b c✲✲
Figure 1: From left to right, diagrams of ϕ0, ϕ1, ϕ2, and an arbitrary f .
Observe that ϕm+n(ϕn) = ϕn, for any m and n of L.
Definition 4 f [t] iff t 6= f ∧ f(t) 6= 0. We read f [t] as “f acts on t”.
Whereas f(t) is a term, f [t] abbreviates a formula. No f acts on itself. The
intuitive idea is to allow us to talk about what a function f does . For example,
0 and ϕ0 do nothing whatsoever, since there is no t on which they act. On the
other hand, there is a term t on which ϕ1 acts, namely, ϕ0.
Theorem 14 0 and ϕ0 are the only functions who do not act on any t.
Proof If f does not act on any t, then ∀t(t = f ∨ f(t) = 0). Suppose f is
neither 0 nor ϕ0. Then there is t such that t 6= f ∧ f(t) 6= 0. But that
entails f [t]. So, the only functions which do not act on any t are 0 and
ϕ0.
Theorem 15 σ1 = 0.
Proof σ1 6= 0⇒ 1(σ1) = 0 (Definition 2). That happens only if σ1 = 0.
Theorem 16 For any g, σg 6= 1
Proof Suppose there is g such that σg = 1. Since 1 6= 0, then g(1) = 0 and
1(g) = g, according to Definition 2. So, g 6= 1. Once again from Definition
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2, g(x) = 1(x) for any x 6= 1. But those are the same conditions for
1 ◦ 1 = g, according to F5. Since any F-composition is unique, then g = 1
(Theorem 11), which contradicts the assumption g 6= 1. So, there is no
such g.
In other words, the existence of some ‘functions’ in Flow is forbidden.
Definition 5 For any function f , a restriction g of f is defined as
g ⊆ f iff g 6= 0 ∧ ∀x((g[x]⇒ f [x]) ∧ ((g[x] ∧ f [x])⇒ f(x) = g(x))),
Proper restrictions are defined as g ⊂ f iff g ⊆ f ∧ g 6= f . We abbreviate
¬(g ⊆ f) and ¬(g ⊂ f) as, respectively, g 6⊆ f and g 6⊂ f . For example, ϕ1 ⊆ ϕ3,
ϕ1 ⊂ ϕ3, and ϕ3 6⊆ ϕ1.
Theorem 17 ∀f∀g(g ⊂ f ⇒ g(f) = 0).
Proof Suppose g(f) 6= 0. Since g 6= f , then g[f ]. But for any f we have ¬f [f ].
In other words, ¬(g[f ]⇒ f [f ]). Hence, g 6⊆ f .
Some of the most useful restrictions are obtained from a given formula F ,
in a way which resembles the well known Separation Scheme. That is achieved
thanks to careful considerations regarding the F-successor function σ. But be-
fore that, we need more concepts, since we are interested on a vast number of
situations.
Definition 6 A term f is comprehensive iff there is g such that g 6= 0, g ⊆ f ,
and σg = 0; and we denote that by C(f). Otherwise, f is uncomprehensive.
Comprehensive functions are supposed to describe “huge” functions who
act on “many terms”, and they are partially regulated by some of the the next
axioms. If f itself is such that σf = 0, then f is comprehensive, except when f =
0. Besides, it is easy to see that 1 is comprehensive and 0 is uncomprehensive.
On the other hand, there are other comprehensive functions which, by the way,
play an important role within our proposal for cardinalities and model theory.
But for now we are mostly interested on uncomprehensive functions, as it follows.
Definition 7 E(f) iff (i) σf 6= 0; (ii) ∀x(f [x] ⇒ (E(x) ∧ E(f(x)))).
We read E(f) as “f is emergent”. ϕ0 is vacuously emergent. That entails ϕ1
is emergent. A function like f given by f(ϕ0) = ϕ1, f(ϕ1) = ϕ0, f(f) = f , and
f(r) = 0 (where r stands for the remaining values r) is emergent. Obviously, last
claim demands the existence of such an f and the existence of σf 6= 0, something
which is accomplished thanks to the next postulates. Emergent functions are
supposed to be uncomprehensive terms who act only on uncomprehensive terms.
Definition 8 g E f iff g 6= 0 ∧ ∀x(g[x] ⇒ ((f [x] ∨ ∃a(f(a) = x)) ∧ (f [g(x)] ∨
∃b(f(b) = g(x))))). If g E f , we say g lurks f . Besides, g ⊳ f iff g E f and
g 6= f . In that case we say g properly lurks f . Finally, ¬(g E f) and ¬(g ⊳ f)
are abbreviated as g 5 f and g ⋪ f , respectively.
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As an example, if f is the same function of last paragraph, then f ⊳ ϕ2 and
ϕ2 ⊳ f . As another example, ϕ2 ⊳ ϕ4, but ϕ4 5 ϕ2.
Theorem 18 If g ⊆ f and g 6= 0, then g E f .
The proof is straightforward. The converse is obviously not valid.
Definition 9 h = p(f) iff ∀x(h[x]⇔ x E f). h is the full power of f .
The full power p(f) of f acts on all terms x who lurk f .
Theorem 19 If f ⊂ 1 acts on n terms, then p(f) acts on (n+ 1)n terms.
Proof If f acts on n terms xi and g lurks f , each xi may correspond to any xj
(where eventually xj = xi) in the sense we may have g(xi) = xj . On the
other hand, we may have g(xi) = 0 as well. Thus, for each xi (n possible
values) there are n+ 1 possible images. So, there are (n+ 1)n terms who
lurk f .
F8 - Coherence ∀f(E(f) ⇒ (∀g((g E f ⇒ σg 6= 0) ∧ ∀h((h[g] ⇔ g E f) ⇒
σh 6= 0)) ∧ ∀i(∀t(i[t]⇒ ∃x(x[t] ∧ f [x])))⇒ σi 6= 0)).
If f is emergent, then any g (if it exists) who lurks f has a non-0 F-successor.
Function h at F8 refers to the full power of f , if it exists. Finally, term i is useful
for dealing with arbitrary union, if we are able to define it. The usual power
of a ZF-set (Definition 12 and Theorem 35) and arbitrary unions (Definition 15
and Theorem 37) are definable thanks to the next postulate coupled with F8.
Observe F8 is an existence postulate. For understanding this, recall F6,
which provides necessary and sufficient conditions for knowing if σf 6= 0: there
must be a g different of f such that certain conditions are met. The point here
is that F8 grants the existence of certain terms which are F-successors of others,
as long some conditions are met. When we say, as above, that σg 6= 0, we state
there is a function z 6= 0 such that σg = z. The same happens to σh and σi.
Definition 10 Z(f) iff (i) σf 6= 0; (ii) ∀x(f [x]⇒ (f(x) = x ∧ Z(x))).
Z(f) reads “f is a ZF-set”. Any ZF-set f is a restriction of 1, where σf 6= 0;
and if f acts on x, then σx 6= 0. Besides, every restriction of a ZF-set has
its own non-0 F-successor (F8). So, every restriction of a ZF-set is a ZF-set.
Observe ϕ0 vacuously satisfies last definition. Therefore, ϕ1 is a ZF-set and so
on. Observe as well, out of curiosity, σ is not a ZF-set, since σ(ϕ0) = ϕ1 6= ϕ0.
Every ZF-set is an emergent function which is a restriction of 1.
Theorem 20 No ZF-set is comprehensive.
Proof If f is a ZF-set, then σf 6= 0 and f acts on terms t such σt 6= 0. From
F8, any restriction g of f is such that σg 6= 0.
Theorem 21 Every ϕn is a ZF-set.
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Proof Z(ϕ0) is vacuously valid. Now, let n > 0. Then any ϕn acts only on
ϕm and ϕn(ϕm) = ϕm, where 0 < m < n. And each ϕm has a non-0
F-successor, from the definition itself for ϕm. From F8, that entails that
any restriction g of ϕn has a non-0 F-successor. So, Z(ϕn) for any n from
language L.
Definition 11 Let f be a function and F (t) be a formula where all occurrences
of t are free. We say g is restriction of f under F (t), and denote this by
g = f
∣∣
F (t)
, iff: (i) g 6= 0; (ii) f(σg) = 0 ∨ ¬F (g); (iii) g 6= f ⇒ g(f) = 0; (iv)
∀t((t 6= f ∧ t 6= g)⇒ ((g(t) = f(t)∧F (t)∧ f [t])∨ (g(t) = 0∧ (¬F (t)∨¬f [t])))).
Formula g = f
∣∣
F (t)
is somehow equivalent to g ⊆ f , as we see next.
Theorem 22 If g ⊆ f , then it is possible to state a formula F where g = f
∣∣
F
.
Proof If g ⊆ f , assume as formula F (t) the next one: g[t]. Item (i) of Definition
11 is a consequence from Definition 5. Item (ii) of the same definition is
granted thanks to the fact that ¬g[g] (¬F (g)) for any g. Item (iii) is due
to Theorem 17. Finally, item (iv) is granted from Definition 5.
Theorem 23 If g = f
∣∣
F
, then g ⊆ f .
Proof If g = f
∣∣
F
, then either g = ϕ0 or g 6= ϕ0. In the first case, the proof
is immediate by vacuity (ϕ0 does not act on any term). If g 6= ϕ0, then
item (iv) of Definition 11 demands, for any t, g[t] ⇒ (f [t] ∧ g(t) = f(t)).
Thus, g ⊆ f .
A natural way of getting some restrictions g of f is through F9E below.
Observe as well item (iv) of Definition 11 takes into account the self-reference
postulate, since we demand t 6= f∧t 6= g. Now, if F (t) is a formula (abbreviated
by F ) where all occurrences of t are free, then the following is an axiom.
F9E - E-Restriction ∀f((∀x(F (x)⇒ E(x))⇒ ∃!g(g = f
∣∣
F
))).
Subscript E highlights a strong commitment to emergent functions. Many
restrictions due to this last postulate grant the existence of emergent functions
and ZF-sets as well. Next theorem, for example, shows we do not need F-
composition to prove there is ϕ0.
Theorem 24 0
∣∣
F (x)
= ϕ0
∣∣
F (x)
= ϕ0 if F (x)⇒ E(x).
Proof Immediate, since neither 0 nor ϕ0 act on any term and no restriction
can be 0.
Theorem 25 For any emergent f we have: (i) f
∣∣
x 6=x∧E(x)
= ϕ0;
(ii) f
∣∣
x=x∧E(x)
= f ; (iii) f
∣∣
x 6=f∧E(x)
= f ; (iv) f
∣∣
x=f
= ϕ0.
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Proof Item (i) is proven by vacuity. (ii) takes into account all terms where f
acts. About (iii) and (iv), recall f plays no role into the calculation of
its restriction. All that matters are the terms where f acts.
From F9E, there are four possible restrictions g of ϕ2. If F (x) is, for example,
“x = ϕ0”, then g = ϕ1. Accordingly, assume f = ϕ2 in F9E. So, consider, e.g.,
x = ϕ0. Such a value for x is different of ϕ2. Besides, F (ϕ0). That implies
g(ϕ0) = ϕ2(ϕ0) = ϕ0. For all remaining values x 6= ϕ0, we know g does not
act on x. That means g acts solely on ϕ0. And according to F7, that function
is supposed to be ϕ1. Observe ϕ1 is allowed to have a free occurrence in F (x),
according to our Restriction Axiom. Nevertheless g does not act on ϕ1 in our
first example. That means either g(ϕ1) = 0 or g = ϕ1. In this case, we have
g = ϕ1. Latter on we define a membership relationship ∈ (Definition 19) where
x ∈ f iff f [x] and some conditions are imposed over f and x. That entails
we can guarantee that in a translation of ZF’s Separation Scheme into Flow’s
language, any free occurrence of g in F (x) will have no impact (in a precise
sense). After all, in this first example F (x) is x = ϕ0, while g is ϕ1. For details
see Section 3.
Resuming, if F (x) is the formula “x = ϕ0 ∨ x = ϕ1”, then g = ϕ2. If F (x)
is “x = x”, then again g = ϕ2. If F (x) is “x 6= x”, then g = ϕ0. The novelty
here, however, happens with the formula F (x) given by “x = ϕ1”. In that case
we have a proper restriction γ such that γ 6= ϕ1, γ(γ) = γ, γ(ϕ1) = ϕ1, and
γ(x) = 0 for any x different of ϕ1 and γ itself. Thus, γ is a new function whose
existence is granted thanks to F9E and no other previous postulate.
Definition 12 z is the restricted power of f iff ∀x(x 6= z ⇒ ((z(x) = x⇔ x ⊆
f) ∧ (z(x) = 0⇔ x 6⊆ f))). We denote z as ℘(f).
For example, ℘(ϕ0) = ϕ1, ℘(ϕ1) = ϕ2, and ℘(ϕ2) = f , where f(ϕ0) = ϕ0,
f(ϕ1) = ϕ1, f(ϕ2) = ϕ2, f(γ) = γ, f(f) = f , and f(x) = 0 for the remaining
values x. Recall γ acts only on ϕ1 and γ(ϕ1) = ϕ1.
Observe z = ℘(f) is a restriction of 1, even if f is not. Besides, ℘ is not a
function, but a metalinguistic symbol which helps us to abbreviate the formula
z = ℘(f) given by the definition above. Observe as well ℘(f) ⊆ p(f), for any f .
While p(f) refers to a function who acts on all terms that lurk f , ℘(f) acts on
all terms that lurk f as long they are restrictions of f .
If g = p(f), we can get ℘(f) in the case where f is a ZF-set, in the sense
℘(f) is the term which acts on all restrictions of f . For details see Theorem 35.
Observation 3 In a sense, F9E is similar to the Separation Scheme in ZFC,
since it states the existence of a unique g obtained from a given f and a formula
F (x). Nevertheless, the role of Separation Scheme in ZFC is not limited to
grant the existence of subsets. Thanks to that postulate, ZFC avoids antinomies
like Russell’s paradox. In our case those antinomies are avoided by means of
the simple use of Self-Reference (Observation 1). That is one of the reasons
why we do not prohibit free occurrences of g in F (x) (like what happens in
ZFC). Actually, if we demanded no free occurrences of g in F (x), we would be
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unable to obtain some useful restrictions, as we can see in the examples below.
Nevertheless, we demand ∀x((x 6= g ∧ x 6= f) ⇒ ((f(x) = g(x) ∧ F (x)) ∨
(g(x) = 0 ∧ ¬F (x))) (Definition 11), which is a weaker condition than the
prohibition of occurrences of g in F (x). If we recall Observation 1, we can
easily see that, for any y and any r, neither y
∣∣
x(x) 6=y
nor y
∣∣
x(x) 6=r
allow us to
get any contradiction in the style of Russell’s paradox. Finally, if anyone tries
to “define” a function f from a formula F (x) without using F9E, it is perfectly
possible to get a contradiction. For example, we can “define” a function f as it
follows: ∀x(f(x) = ϕ0). Since no f acts on 0, we have a contradiction, namely,
f(0) = ϕ0. Nevertheless, that would not be a definition at all, but simply a new
postulate which is inconsistent with our axioms.
Definition 13 f ∼ g iff ∀t((f [t]⇔ g[t]) ∧ ((t 6= f ∧ t 6= g)⇒ f(t) = g(t))).
If f ∼ g but f 6= g, we say f and g are clones , as discussed in Observation 2.
Regarding their images, clones f and g differ solely on f and g: f(g) = 0, while
g(g) = g, and g(f) = 0, while f(f) = f . It is easy to see that ∼ is reflexive.
Theorem 26 Let f be emergent. Then, for any h 6= 0, h ∼ f entails h = f .
Proof From Theorem 25, f = f
∣∣
t=t∧E(t)
. Since h ∼ f , h = f
∣∣
t=t∧E(t)
as well.
But F9E says any restriction is unique. Thus, h = f .
This last theorem grants 0 and ϕ0 are the only clones in Flow, at least
among emergent functions. That is a useful result for discussing subjects like
the ‘quantity’ of restrictions of any f .
Theorem 27 ∀f(ϕ0 ⊆ f).
Proof Theorem 14 states ϕ0 is the only function different of 0 who do not act
on any term. Thus, Definition 5 grants formula above is proven by vacuity.
Theorem 28 For any x and y, x ⊂ y entails y 6⊂ x.
Proof If x and y are, respectively, ϕ0 and 0, the proof is straightforward, since
0 is never any restriction, according to F9E. For the remaining cases,
x ⊂ y entails x 6= y and, for any t, x[t] ⇒ (y[t] ∧ x(t) = y(t)). So, there
is t′ where y[t′] ∧ ¬x[t′] or y[t′] ∧ x[t′] ∧ x(t′) 6= y(t′). In anyone of those
cases we have y 6⊂ x.
Theorem 29 σ and 0 are the only functions f such that σf = f .
Proof We already know σσ = σ (F2) and σ0 = 0 (Theorem 10). If f 6= 0 and
σf = 0, then σf 6= f . If f 6= σ, f 6= 0 and σf 6= 0, then F6 and Definition
2 demand σf 6= f .
Theorem 30 ∀f(E(f)⇒ f = σf
∣∣
x 6=f∧E(x)
).
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Proof E(f) entails σf 6= 0. So, σf acts on all terms where f acts. But σf acts
on just one more term: f itself. Since formula F (x) in the restriction above
is “x 6= f ∧ E(x)” (observe we follow all demands for F (x) in F9E), then
σf
∣∣
x 6=f∧E(x)
acts exactly on all terms where f acts. Besides, they share all
their images, according to F9E. So, σf
∣∣
x 6=f∧E(x)
= f , since f [x]⇒ x 6= f .
Definition 14 f is an ordered pair (a, b), with both values a and b different of
0, iff there are α and β such that α 6= f , β 6= f , α 6= a, β 6= b and
f(x) =


α if x = α
β if x = β
0 if x 6= f ∧ x 6= α ∧ x 6= β
where α(a) = a, α(x) = 0 if x is neither a nor α, β(a) = a, β(b) = b, β(x) = 0
if x is neither a nor b or β.
We have two kinds of ordered pairs: those where α 6= b (first kind) and those
where α = b (second kind). The diagram of the first kind is as follows:
f x
α
x
β
axx xba
g
x
x
β
α = b
a
x
Figure 2: Diagrams of f = (a, b) and g = (a, b) of the first and second
kind.
Left diagram above concerns the case where f acts only on α and β, while α
acts only on a, and β acts only on a and b. In the particular case where a = b,
we have α = β, and the ordered pair f is (a, a). So, (a, a) is a function f which
acts solely on α, while α acts solely on a. Observe that f(a) = f(b) = 0 (f
never acts neither on a nor on b) if f is an ordered pair of the first kind. Thus,
f is (a, b) iff f acts only on α and β, which act, respectively, only on a and only
on a and b. To get (b, a), all we have to do is to exchange α by a function α′
which acts only on b. Our definition is obviously inspired on the standard notion
due to Kuratowski. In standard set theory (a, b) is a set {{a}, {a, b}} such that
neither a nor b belong to (a, b). In Flow, on the other hand, an ordered pair
(a, b) of the first kind is a function which does not act neither on a nor on b.
Nevertheless, the second kind of ordered pair shows our approach is not
equivalent to Kuratowki’s. In the case where α = b, we have the diagram to
the right of Figure 2. This non-Kuratowskian ordered pair g = (a, b) acts on
b, although it does not act on a. And no Kuratowskian ordered pair (a, b) ever
acts on either a or b. So, in the general case, no ordered pair (a, b) ever acts on
a. That means:
Theorem 31 Any ordered pair (a, a) is Kuratowskian.
The proof is straightforward. Since any ordered pair (a, b) is a function, for
the sake of abbreviation we write x(a, b) for x((a, b)), for a given function x.
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The reader can observe, from Figure 2, that in a non-Kuratowskian ordered
pair f , β is the non-0 F-successor of α. In other words:
Theorem 32 f = (a, b) is a non-Kuratowskian ordered pair iff f acts only on a
function α - which, in its turn, acts on one single term a - and on its F-successor
σα, where σα 6= 0.
Proof If f = (a, b), then f acts at most on α and β, where α acts only on a and
β acts only on a and b. Suppose f = (a, b) is non-Kuratowskian. Then,
a 6= b (Theorem 31); and f = (a, α), since α = b. But a 6= b entails a 6= α.
And since α acts on a, then β acts on two terms: α and a. But that is
the condition given for granting β = σα, where σα 6= 0. Finally, if f acts
only on α and σα, where α acts only on a and σα 6= 0, then f = (a, α) is
non-Kuratowskian.
Suppose f = 1
∣∣
x=ϕ3∨x=ϕ4
. In that case f acts on ϕ3 and on its F-successor
ϕ4. Nevertheless, ϕ3 does not act on just one single term. Thus, such an f is
not an ordered pair, let alone a non-Kuratowskian ordered pair.
Theorem 33 (a, b) = (c, d) iff a = c and b = d.
Proof Straightforward from Definition 14 and F9E.
Theorem 34 If a and b are both emergent, then there is f = (a, b).
Proof From F9E we define the proper restriction β of 1 for “x = a ∨ x = b”
as formula F (x). So, β(a) = a, β(b) = b, β(β) = β, and β(x) = 0 for
all remaining values of x. Analogously, the proper restriction α of 1 for
“x = a”gives us α(a) = a, α(α) = α, and α(x) = 0 for the remaining
values of x. And, from F9E, we have α 6= a. Analogously, we have β 6= a
and β 6= b. Finally, the proper restriction f of 1 for “x = α ∨ x = β gives
us f(α) = α, f(β) = β, f(f) = f , and f(x) = 0 for all the remaining
values of x. Besides, f 6= α and f 6= β. But function f is exactly that one
in Definition 14. Hence, f = (a, b).
To get an ordered pair (0, 0), all we have to do is to consider ϕ1, which acts
only on ϕ0. So, ϕ1 =def (0, 0). If f acts only on α and ϕ0, where α acts only on
a 6= 0, then we adopt the convention f = (a, 0). For example, ϕ2 is the ordered
pair (ϕ0, 0). There are no ordered pairs of the form (0, b), where b 6= 0.
Theorem 35 If f is a ZF-set, then ℘(f) is a ZF-set.
Proof If f is a ZF-set, then it is emergent. So, f acts only on emergent functions
and F8 says any t who lurks f is emergent. Now, let h = 1
∣∣
tEf
. Then,
h[t] ⇔ t E f . So, h = p(f) (Definition 9). But F8 also says such an h is
emergent. From Definition 12, p = ℘(f) = 1
∣∣
t⊆f
. But p lurks h. So, once
again from F8, σp 6= 0.
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Definition 15 Let Z(f). The arbitrary ZF-union of all terms g where f acts
(or arbitrary union of f , for short) is defined as u =
⋃
f [g] g = 1
∣∣
∃g(f [g]∧g[t])
.
The idea of arbitrary union is as it follows. If f acts on any g which acts on
any x, then u acts on that very same x; and if no g acts on a given x, then u
does not act on that x. Particularly, we write u = g ∪ h for the case where f
acts at most on g and h.
Definition 16 Let Z(f). Then
⋂
f [g] g =def 1
∣∣
∀g(f [g]⇒g[t])
.
Observe the definition above is equivalent to
⋂
f [g] g =
(⋃
f [g] g
) ∣∣
∀g(f [g]⇒g[t])
.
If f acts only on g and h, the arbitrary intersection may be written as g∩ h. In
particular, for any m and n from language L, ϕm ∩ ϕn = ϕm ◦ ϕn.
Theorem 36
⋃
0[g] =
⋃
ϕ0[g]
=
⋃
ϕ1[g]
= ϕ0.
Proof is straightforward. Last identity from last theorem illustrates our
previous claim that it is possible the union u be one of the terms where f does
act: ϕ1 acts on ϕ0, and
⋃
ϕ1[g]
= ϕ0.
Theorem 37 For any f , Z(f)⇒ Z(
⋃
f [g] g).
Proof If u =
⋃
f [g] g = 1
∣∣
∃g(f [g]∧g[t])
, then it satisfies last conjunction of F8.
Thus, σu 6= 0. That entails u is a ZF-set.
Theorem 38 Let x and y be ZF-sets. Then, x ∩ y acts on t iff x[t] ∧ y[t].
The proof is immediate. Besides, if x and y are ZF-sets, then Z(x ∩ y).
Theorem 39 For any pair m and n from language L, ϕm ∪ ϕn = ϕmax{m,n},
where max{m,n} denotes the maximum value between m and n relatively to .
Proof Straightforward from Definition 15.
Theorem 40 For any g and h we have g ∪ h = h ∪ g.
Proof Straightforward from Definition 15.
Observe for any f 6= 0 we have f ∪ ϕ0 = f .
Let α(x, y) be a formula where there is at least one occurrence of x, one
occurrence of y, and all of them are free. Then, next formula is an axiom.
F10α - Creation ∀x∃!y(α(x, y)) ⇒ ∀f(E(f) ⇒ ∃g∀x∀y((α(x, y) ∧ x 6= g) ⇒
((f [x]⇒ g(x) = y) ∧ (¬f [x]⇒ g(x) = 0))) ∧ σg 6= 0).
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This last postulate is supposed to define functions g from certain formulas
α and any f , as long f is emergent. We say g is created by f and α(x, y), and
denote this by g = f
∣∣α(x,y) or, simply, g = f ∣∣α. Postulate F10α motivates us
to employ an alternative notation for functions. When we see fit to do so, we
may eventually write a f7−→ b meaning f(a) = b. One obvious advantage is that
it can be used to easily write down strings like a1
f
7−→ a2
f
7−→ a3
f
7−→ · · ·, meaning
f(a1) = a2, f(a2) = a3, and so on.
F10α allows us to get restrictions by other means besides F9E. For example,
from F10α there is a g such that ϕ1
g
7−→ ϕ2
g
7−→ ϕ3
g
7−→ 0. In that case g ⊂ σ.
Function g could be created, e.g., from ϕ4.
With the aid of F10α it is quite easy to show F-composition is not commu-
tative. As an example, consider f as a function given by ϕ1
f
7−→ ϕ2
f
7−→ ϕ2 and
g given by ϕ2
g
7−→ ϕ3
g
7−→ ϕ3. In that case g ◦ f is given by ϕ1 g◦f7−→ ϕ3 g◦f7−→ 0 and
ϕ2
g◦f
7−→ ϕ3
g◦f
7−→ 0, while f ◦ g is simply ϕ0 (which is obviously different of g ◦ f).
However, there are some functions which cannot exist, even with the com-
prehensive character of F10α, as we can see in the next theorem.
Theorem 41 There is no x where, for a given t 6= 1, t x7−→ 1 x7−→ t.
Proof Suppose there is such a function x. Then, from F5, x ◦ x is given by
t x◦x7−→ t and 1 x◦x7−→ 1. But from Theorem 5 we have that any function h such
that h(1) = 1 entails h = 1. Thus, x ◦ x is supposed to be 1. But since x
is different of 1, then x ◦ x cannot be 1, according to Theorem 12. That
is a contradiction!
Definition 17 f is injective iff ∀r∀s((f [r] ∧ f [s] ∧ r 6= s)⇒ f(r) 6= f(s)). We
denote this by I(f).
For example, any ϕn is injective.
Definition 18 If E(f), DomFf = 1
∣∣
f [t]
and ImFf = 1
∣∣
∃x(f(x)=t)
are, respectively,
the F-domain and the F-image of f . We denote f as f : DomFf → Im
F
f .
When we write f : x→ y, that means x = DomFf and y = Im
F
f , as long f is
emergent. If we recall that E, E, and I are given, respectively, in Definitions 8,
7, and 17, next formula is our last axiom of this Section.
F11 - F-Choice ∀f((E(f) ∧ ∃r∃s(r 6= s ∧ f [r] ∧ f [s] ∧ f(r) 6= f(s)))⇒
∃c(c E f ∧ I(c) ∧DomFc ⊆ Dom
F
f ∧ Im
F
c = Im
F
f ∧ c 6⊆ f)).
This last postulate refers to emergent functions f which act on more than
one single term and such that there are at least two terms r and s where f acts
and f(r) 6= f(s). In that case it says there always is a choice-function c whose
F-domain is a restriction of f ’s F-domain but such that c is injective. Besides,
c lurks f (Definition 8) but it is no restriction of f . For example, let f be given
by f(ϕ0) = ϕ7, f(ϕ1) = ϕ8, and f(ϕ2) = ϕ8. In that case there may be an c
such that, e.g., c(ϕ0) = ϕ8 and c(ϕ1) = ϕ7.
Last axiom grants the existence of certain injective functions from arbitrary
surjective functions whose F-images act on at least two terms.
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F11T - F-Trivial Choice ∀f((E(f) ∧ ∀r∀s((r 6= s ∧ f [r] ∧ f [s]) ⇒ f(r) =
f(s)))⇒ ∃c(c E f ∧ I(c) ∧DomFc ⊆ Dom
F
f ∧ Im
F
c = Im
F
f )).
This last formula is a complement for F11 in the sense it refers to the trivial
case where all images f(r) have the same constant value, if f [r]. In that case
the choice c is necessarily a restriction of f such that c acts on one single term.
Theorem 42 (Partition Principle) If f : DomFf → Im
F
f is emergent, there
is an injection g : ImFf → Im
F
g , where Im
F
g ⊆ Dom
F
f .
Proof First we consider the case ∃r∃s(f [r] ∧ f [s] ∧ f(r) 6= f(s)). F11 says
there is an injective choice-function c : DomFc → Im
F
f , where Dom
F
c ⊆
DomFf . Since all terms involved are emergent, we can use F10α to define
g = u
∣∣α(x,y), where u = DomFc ∪ ImFf and α(x, y) is the next formula:
(ImFc [x] ⇒ ∃t(c(t) = x ∧ y = t)) ∧ (¬Im
F
c [x] ⇒ y = 0). Formula α(x, y)
satisfies the demands from F10α, since c is injective. And that fact entails
g is injective as well. Observe both c and g lurk f , although c is no
restriction of f . The case where ∀r∀s((r 6= s∧ f [r]∧ f [s])⇒ f(r) = f(s))
is analogous to the previous one. The only difference is that now DomFc
and ImFf act on one single term, each. Besides, in that case c is necessarily
a restriction of f .
Theorem 42 is the Flow-theoretic version of the well-known Partition Prin-
ciple. Its correspondence to the Partition Principle in the sense of ZF depends
on considerations to be discussed in Sections 3 and 4.
Definition 19 x ∈ f iff f ⊂ 1 ∧ Z(x) ∧ f [x].
The negation of formula x ∈ f is abbreviated as x 6∈ f . We read x ∈ f as
“x belongs to f” or “x is a member of f”. The symbol ∈ is called membership
relation. In Section 3 we prove ZF is ‘immersed’ within Flow. Thanks to last
definition it is possible, at least in principle, to prove ZFU (ZF with Urelemente,
or atoms) is immersed within Flow as well. After all, there can be many terms
x such that no one belongs to them as long those x are not ZF-sets. A simple
example is σ (and all their non-trivial restrictions), which is no restriction of 1.
But that is a task for future papers.
Theorem 43 (i) ∀x(x 6∈ x); (ii) ∀x(0 6∈ x); (iii) ∀x(1 6∈ x).
Proof Item (i) is consequence from F2, since no x acts on itself. Item (ii) is
consequence from Theorem 10: no x acts on 0. Item (iii) is immediate,
since 1 is not a ZF-set.
Item (i) looks like a proof that Flow is well-founded. Nevertheless, the issue
of regularity is a little more subtle than that, as we can see later on.
{f, g} =def 1
∣∣
x=f∨x=g
, where E(f) ∧ E(g). So, a pair {f, g} is a restriction
of 1 which acts only on f and g, as long they are both emergent.
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Theorem 44 Let E(f) ∧ E(g). If u = {f, g} is a pair, then E(u).
Proof Let h = ϕ2
∣∣α(x,y) be defined from F10α by formula α(x, y) given by
(x = ϕ0 ⇒ y = f) ∧ (x = ϕ1 ⇒ y = g) ∧ ((x 6= ϕ0 ∧ x 6= ϕ1) ⇒ y = 0).
According to F10α, σh 6= 0. And since h acts on emergent functions, then
h is emergent. Now, let u = 1
∣∣
t=g(ϕ0)∨t=g(ϕ1)
. That entails u lurks h.
And axiom F8 grants σu 6= 0. Hence, u is emergent.
In particular, any pair of ZF-sets is a ZF-set.
On the left side of the image below we find a Venn diagram of a set f (in
the sense of ZF), with its elements g, h, and i. On the right side there is a
diagram of a ZF-set f (in the sense of Flow) which acts on g, h, and i. One
of the main differences between both pictorial representations is the absence of
arrows in the Venn diagram. Sets are ‘static’ objects, which do nothing besides
being elements of other sets. Venn diagrams do not emphasize the full role
of the Extensionality Axiom from ZF: a set is defined either by its elements
or by those terms who do not belong to it as well. Within Flow, however, it
is explicitly emphasized that anything which is not inside the rectangle of a
diagram has an image 0. Thus, in a sense, Flow diagrams were always somehow
implicit within Venn diagrams. At the end, standard extensional set theories,
like ZFC, are simply particular cases of a general theory of functions, as we can
formally check at Subsection 3.2.
✫✪
✬✩f
g h
i
f
g
x x x
h i
Figure 3: Comparison between Venn diagrams and Flow diagrams.
Theorem 45 Any inductive function which acts only on ZF-sets is a ZF-set.
Proof Immediate from the definitions of inductive function and ZF-set.
Definition 20 f is a proper class iff ∀x(f [x]⇒ Z(x)) ∧ C(f).
In other words, no proper class is a ZF-set.
Theorem 46 There is one single ZF-set f such that for any x, we have x 6∈ f .
Proof f = ϕ0. From F6, ϕ0 is unique. From Theorem 14, ϕ0 is the only term
different of 0 (recall 0 is not a ZF-set) which satisfies the condition given
above. In other words, ϕ0 is the empty ZF-set, which can be denoted by
∅.
3 ZF is immersed in Flow
We prove here vast portions of standard mathematics can be developed within
Flow.
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3.1 ZFC axioms
ZFC is a first-order theory with identity and with one predicate letter f21 , such
that the formula f21 (x, y) is abbreviated as x ∈ y, if x and y are terms, and is
read as “x belongs to y” or “x is an element of y”. The negation ¬(x ∈ y) is
abbreviated as x 6∈ y. The axioms of ZFC are the following:
ZF1 - Extensionality ∀x∀y(∀z(z ∈ x⇔ z ∈ y)⇒ x = y)
ZF2 - Empty set ∃x∀y(¬(y ∈ x))
ZF3 - Pair ∀x∀y∃z∀t(t ∈ z ⇔ t = x ∨ t = y)
x ⊆ y =def ∀z(z ∈ x⇒ z ∈ y)
ZF4 - Power set ∀x∃y∀z(z ∈ y ⇔ z ⊆ x)
If F (x) is a formula where there is no free occurrences of y, then:
ZF5F - Separation ∀z∃y∀x(x ∈ y ⇔ x ∈ z ∧ F (x))
The set y is denoted by {x ∈ z/F (x)}.
If α(x, y) is a formula where all occurrences of x and y are free, then:
ZF6α - Replacement ∀x∃!yα(x, y)⇒ ∀z∃w∀t(t ∈ w ⇔ ∃s(s ∈ z ∧ α(s, t)))
ZF7 - Union set ∀x∃y∀z(z ∈ y ⇔ ∃t(z ∈ t ∧ t ∈ x))
The set y from ZF7 is abbreviated as y =
⋃
t∈x t.
ZF8 - Infinite ∃x(∅ ∈ x ∧ ∀y(y ∈ x⇒ y ∪ {y} ∈ x))
ZF9 - Choice ∀x(∀y∀z((y ∈ x ∧ z ∈ x ∧ y 6= z)⇒ (y 6= ∅ ∧ y ∩ z = ∅))⇒
∃y∀z(z ∈ x⇒ ∃w(y ∩ z = {w})))
3.2 ZF translation
We refer to Flow as F.
Proposition 1 There is a translation from the language of ZF into the language
of F such that every translated axiom of ZF is a theorem in F.
The translation from ZF (ZFC except Choice) into F is provided below.
Translating ZF into F
ZF F
∀ ∀Z
∃ ∃Z
x ∈ y y[x]
x ⊆ y x ⊆ y
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where Z is the predicate “to be a ZF-set” from Definition 10. Observe as well
the translation of ∈ follows Definition 19 due to the use of bounded quantifiers.
The proof of Proposition 1 is made through the following lemmas.
Lemma 1 ⊢F “Translated ZF1
′′.
Proof The translation of ZF1 is ∀Zx∀Zy(∀Zz(x[z]⇔ y[z])⇒ x = y). If x and
y are ZF-sets and x[z] and y[z], then x(z) = z and y(z) = z (Definition
10). If ¬x[z] or ¬y[z], then either x(z) = 0 or y(z) = 0; or z = x or z = y.
So, the translated ZF1 considers the case where both x and y share the
same images, except perhaps for z = x or z = y. Thus, x[z] ⇔ y[z] is
equivalent to say that for any z we have x(z) = y(z), except perhaps for
z = x or z = y. That means x ∼ y (Definition 13). But Theorem 26 says
0 and ϕ0 are the only clones. Since 0 is not a ZF-set, then the translation
of ZF1 is a theorem for every ZF-set.
Lemma 2 ⊢F “Translated ZF2
′′.
Proof Translated ZF2 is ∃Zx∀Zy(¬(x[y])): a corollary from Theorem 46.
Lemma 3 ⊢F “Translated ZF3
′′.
Proof Translated ZF3 is ∀Zx∀Zy∃Zz∀Zt(z[t] ⇔ (t = x ∨ t = y)). That is a
consequence from Theorem 44.
Lemma 4 ⊢F “Translated ZF4
′′.
Proof ]Translated ZF4 is ∀Zx∃Zy∀Zz(y[z]⇔ z ⊆ x). Theorem 35.
Lemma 5 ⊢F “Translated ZF5
′′.
Proof Translated ZF5 is ∀Zf∃Zg∀Zx(g[x] ⇔ f [x] ∧ F (x)). If g = f
∣∣
F
(F9E),
then g ⊆ f . Besides, any restriction of a ZF-set is a ZF-set. Translated
ZF5 demands no occurrence of g in F . Recalling Observation 3, the
calculation of g = f
∣∣
F
does not take into account any t = g. So, any
occurrence of g in F becomes irrelevant.
Lemma 6 ⊢F “Translated ZF6
′′.
Proof Translated ZF6 is ∀Zx∃Z!yα(x, y) ⇒ ∀Zz∃Zw∀Zt(w[t] ⇔ ∃Zs(z[s] ∧
α(s, t))) (we are supposed to rewrite ZF6 by means of ∀ and ∃, and only
then translate it!). Let g = z
∣∣α(s,t) be defined from F10α by formula α(s, t)
provided by translated ZF6. According to F10α, σg 6= 0; and since g acts
on emergent functions, then g is emergent. Now, let w = 1
∣∣
∃s(z[s]∧t=g(s))
.
That entails w lurks g. And axiom F8 grants σw 6= 0. Hence, w is emer-
gent. But w is a restriction of 1 with σw 6= 0 and who acts only on ZF-sets.
Therefore, w is a ZF-set.
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Lemma 7 ⊢F “Translated ZF7
′′.
Proof The translated F7 is the formula ∀Zf∃Zu∀Zt(u[t] ⇔ ∃Zr(r[t] ∧ f [r])).
Once again we changed the names of the original variables in order to
facilitate its reading. But the translated ZF7 is exactly Theorem 37.
Lemma 8 ⊢F “Translated ZF8
′′.
Proof Translated ZF8 is ∃Zx(x[∅]∧∀Zy(x[y]⇒ x[y∪{y}])). F7 states ∃i((∀t(i(t) =
t ∨ i(t) = 0)) ∧ σi 6= 0 ∧ (i(σ0) = σ0 ∧ ∀x(i(x) = x⇒ (i(σx) = σx 6= 0)))).
Well, ∅ is exactly ϕ0. So, i[ϕ0] and i(ϕ0) = ϕ0. Besides, Z(ϕ0), and if
Z(y) then σy 6= 0. And y ∪ {y} is exactly σy , where {y} = 1
∣∣
t=y
. And the
union of ZF-sets is a ZF-set (previous lemma). So, if i acts on a ZF-set t,
then i acts on the ZF-set σt, which makes i itself a ZF-set, since σi 6= 0.
3.3 Grothendieck Universe and cardinals
Next we follow a maneuver somehow inspired on Cantor-Schro¨der-Bernstein
theorem [16].
Definition 21 g and h are equipotent, denoted by g ≡ h, iff there is τ where,
for any t: (i) τ [t] ⇒ τ(τ(t)) = t; (ii) g[t] ⇒ (τ [t] ∧ h[τ(t)]); (iii) h[t] ⇒
(τ [t] ∧ g[τ(t)]); (iv) τ [t]⇒ (g[t] ∨ h[t]). We call function τ a connector of g/h.
For example, any ϕn is equipotent to itself. And a connector of ϕn/ϕn is
ϕn.
Definition 22 g is finite iff ∃h(g ≡ h ∧ τ 6≡ g), where τ is a connector of g/h
(Definition 21); and g is infinite iff it is not finite.
As an example, h = ϕ5
∣∣
t=ϕ3∨t=ϕ4
acts only on ϕ3 and ϕ4. So, if we prove the
existence of τ such that τ(ϕ0) = ϕ3, τ(ϕ3) = ϕ0, τ(ϕ1) = ϕ4, and τ(ϕ4) = ϕ1,
then h ≡ ϕ2 with connector τ . Besides, τ 6≡ ϕ2 ∧ τ 6≡ h, since τ acts on four
terms, while ϕ2 and h act on two terms each. To prove the existence of such a
τ we use F10α, some pages below. But we hope the intuition is insightful.
Theorem 47 ≡ is reflexive among emergent functions.
Proof If f is ϕ0, assume 0 as connector, according to Definition 21. For the
remaining cases, make τ = 1
∣∣
f [x]
as a connector of f/f .
Theorem 48 ∀f∀g((Z(f) ∧ Z(g) ∧ f ≡ g)⇒ σf ≡ σg).
Proof If f and g are ZF-sets, then f ∪g is a ZF-set (Theorem 37). That means
σf 6= 0, σg 6= 0, and σf∪g 6= 0. If f ≡ g, then there is a connector τ of
f/g. Since f ∪g is uncomprehensive, we can apply axiom F10α over f ∪g,
where formula α(x, y) is τ(x) = y. That entails, from F10α, that στ 6= 0.
Besides, σf , σg, and σf∪g are uncomprehensive and ZF-sets. That entails
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we can define a new connector τ ′ for σf/σg. All we have to do is to apply
F10α over σf ∪ σg with formula α′(x, y) given by α(x, y) when x 6= f and
x 6= g, and such that α′(f, g) and α′(g, f). Hence, σf ≡ σg, where τ ′ is
the connector of σf/σg.
The concept of equipotent functions is useful for different purposes. In this
first paper we use it to discuss cardinality, as it follows in the next paragraphs.
We mimic the construction originally introduced by von Neumann.
Theorem 49 r = 1
∣∣
Z(t)∧∀x(t[x]⇒x⊆t)∧(∃x(t[x]⇒∃y(t[y]∧∄s(t[s]∧y[s]))))
⇒ σr = 0.
Proof Restriction r above is a conjunction of three formulas. The first one,
Z(t), grants the applicability of F9E. Now, suppose σr 6= 0. Then Z(r),
since r acts only on ZF-sets. Observe r acts on ϕ0 by vacuity. And,
for any t, r[t] ⇒ r[σt], since t ⊆ σt (where σt 6= 0). Thus, for any x,
r[x] ⇒ x ⊆ r (transitivity). That means r satisfies the second conjunction
of the formula used in the restriction above as well. Since r acts on ϕ0,
then r satisfies the third and final conjunction (well-foundedness). After
all, ϕ0 does not act on any term. So, if F (t) is the formula used in the
restriction above, then F (r). But according to item (ii) of Definition 11,
that entails 1(σr) = 0. And such a condition is satisfied only for σr = 0,
a contradiction. Therefore, r cannot be a ZF-set.
Definition 23 ̟ = 1
∣∣
Z(t)∧∀x(t[x]⇒x⊆t)∧(∃x(t[x]⇒∃y(t[y]∧∄s(t[s]∧y[s]))))
is the ordi-
nal function. If ̟(t) 6= 0, we say t is an ordinal.
Theorem 50 Ordinal function ̟ is well-ordered with respect to actions.
Proof Suppose ̟[u] and ̟[v], where u 6= v. From the definition of ̟ it
follows that either u ⊆ v or v ⊆ u. If u[v] and v[u], then u(v) = v
and v(u) = u, since ̟ acts only on restrictions of 1. But that would
entail u = v, according to F1. Thus, if ̟[u] ∧ ̟[v], then either u[v],
or v[u] or u = v; but it is never the case u[v] and v[u]. That entails
actions define a total order if we are constraining ourselves to all terms
where ̟ acts. Besides, such a total order satisfies trichotomy. Concerning
transitivity, if ̟ acts on u, v, and w in a way such that u ⊆ v and v ⊆ w,
the definition of restriction grants u ⊆ w; and the definition of ̟ grants
that (v[u] ∧ w[v]) ⇒ w[u]. Finally, well-foundedness is granted from the
definition of ̟, since ̟[t]⇒ ∃x(t[x] ∧ ∄y(t[y] ∧ x[y])).
If the ordinal function ̟ acts on any t, then that t admits a least element
with respect to actions. Besides, ̟ satisfies the least-upper-bound property,
i.e., any restriction of ̟ with an upper bound has a least upper bound.
Definition 24 Function c is the cardinality of g, and we denote this by c = |g|,
iff c is the least term (with respect to action) such that ̟[c] and c ≡ g. A
function c is a cardinal iff it is the cardinality of some function g.
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|ϕ3| = ϕ3. As another example, consider ω =
⋂
g⊆i∧g is inductive g (Def-
inition 16), where i is an arbitrary inductive (Definition 3) ZF-set. If we use
analogous procedures from standard set theories, we can easily identify ω with
the ZF-set of natural numbers. And once again we have |ω| = ω, since ̟ acts
on ω and there is no g such that σg = ω. That means ω is an inductive function
and, therefore, σω 6= 0. Hence, ω is a ZF-set. The details are analogous to those
usually employed in ZFC, if we recall that ω[n] can be rewritten as n ∈ ω, and
σn as n ∪ {n}. We can name |ω| simply as ℵ0.
Theorem 51 The cardinality of any ZF-set, if it exists, is a ZF-set.
Proof A sketch for the proof: If f is finite (see Definition 22), then |f | = ϕn for
some n. So, the cardinality of any finite f is a ZF-set. If f is equipotent
to ω, then f is infinite and |f | = ω, where ω is a ZF-set. According to
Theorem 35, the restricted power of any ZF-set is a ZF-set. Besides, the
restricted power of any ordinal is an ordinal. If the ordinal is a ZF-set,
then its restricted power is a ZF-set as well. Besides, if f is a ZF-set and
|f | = c, then the restricted power of f is equipotent to the restricted power
of c. Analogous rationale can be used for arbitrary unions, since the union
of ZF-sets is a ZF-set (Theorem 37), and the arbitrary union of ordinals
is an ordinal (this last statement can be proved in an analogous way how
ordinals are coped in standard literature [13]).
A complete proof of last theorem demands a lot of room unavailable in a
paper as long as this. We hope the sketch above is enough for persuading the
reader.
Theorem 52 1
∣∣
Z(x)
exists and it has F-successor 0.
Proof Let u = 1
∣∣
Z(x)
. We can use F9E, since any ZF-set is emergent. Suppose
σu 6= 0. Then u is a ZF-set. Therefore, σu acts on all ZF-sets. Thus,
σu = u, which is a contradiction.
Theorem 53 1
∣∣
Z(x)
is a Grothendieck Universe.
Proof Let us denote 1
∣∣
Z(x)
by u. Remember r ∈ s iff s ⊂ 1∧Z(r)∧s[r]. For any
x, if u[x], then x is a ZF-set. And according to Definition 10, if x[y] then
y is a ZF-set as well. From Lemma 3 we know that if u[x] and u[y], then
u[{x, y}]. From Theorem 35 we know that if u[x], then u[℘(x)]. Finally,
according to Lemma 7, if u acts on all elements of an arbitrary ZF-set f
(which is equivalent to the notion of a ZF-family of ZF-sets), then u acts
on
⋃
f [g] g.
If the reader is puzzled by the meaning of 1
∣∣
Z(x)
, we are talking about Def-
inition 10. That means 1
∣∣
Z(x)
= 1
∣∣
σx 6=0∧∀t(x[t]⇒(x(t)=t∧Z(t)))
, where Z(t) is re-
cursively defined by σt 6= 0 ∧ ∀r(t[r] ⇒ (t(r) = r ∧ Z(r))). Nothing prevents us
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from assuming Z as a monadic predicate letter to be added to Flow’s language.
That would take place if we assumed the definition of Z as an ampliative one.
But we prefer to assume that as an unnecessary maneuver.
Let u′ = 1
∣∣
Z(t)∧∃x(t[x]∧∄y(t[y]∧x[y]))
. By using the same techniques illustrated
above we can prove σu′ = 0. The reader should observe that such an u
′ is also
a Grothendieck universe, with an extra condition: regularity. So, we refer to
u′ as the well-founded Grothendieck Universe. Observe u′ ⊆ u, where u is the
same function from Theorem 53.
Since the cardinality |u| of a Grothendieck universe u is supu[t]|t|, then The-
orem 53 grants the existence of strongly inaccessible cardinals, provided we are
able to determine cardinalities.
Definition 25 Amodel of ZF is m = 〈u, [],≖〉, where: (i) u ⊂ 1; (ii) ∀x(Z(x) ⇔
u[x]); (iii) p = u
∣∣
∃a∃b(u[a]∧u[b]∧t=(a,b))
; (iv) [] = p
∣∣
∀a∀b(t=(a,b)⇔a[b])
; (v) ≖=
p
∣∣
∀a∀b(t=(a,b)⇔a=b)
.
It is easy to check σp = σ[] = σ≖ = 0, if σu = 0. A model of ZF depends
only on the term u. Function [] maps membership ∈ in ZF, in the same way we
did in Subsection 3.2. Function ≖ maps identity in ZF. Both [] and ≖ depend
on who is u. If u is our Grothendieck universe (Theorem 53), we have at least
one model of ZF, since we proved above ZF is immersed within Flow.
4 The Partition Principle
The Partition Principle (PP), within standard set theories, states: if there is
a surjection f : x → y, then there is an injection g : y → x. The Axiom of
Choice (AC) entails PP. Nevertheless, until now it has endured as the oldest
open problem in set theory whether PP implies AC. For a review about the
subject see, e.g., [2] [10] [12] [23].
Although this Section is based on F-Choice Axiom F11 and F11T , all our
claims regarding the Partition Principle and the Axiom of Choice are expressible
within translated ZF (Section 3). Any function f in the sense of ZF is a set
of ordered pairs. That translates into Flow as an f ⊂ 1 who acts on ordered
pairs (a, b) (Definition 14), where both a and b are ZF-sets. Besides, f itself is
a ZF-set. But F10α grants the existence of an emergent function g such that
g(a) = b whenever f [(a, b)]. So, injective (Definition 17) emergent functions
who act on ZF-sets, in the sense of Flow, correspond to bijective functions in
the sense of ZF (recall we consider only F-images and not ‘codomains’). And
those emergent functions who are not injective, in the sense of Flow, correspond
to surjective functions who are not injective, in the sense of ZF.
Now, consider the next postulate:
Well-Foundedness ∀f((f 6= 0 ∧ f 6= ϕ0)⇒ ∃x(f [x] ∧ ∄t(f [t] ∧ x[t]))).
This is analogous to the axiom of regularity (AR) in ZF, in the sense that the
translation of AR into Flow’s language is a straightforward theorem from our
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proposed Well-Foundedness Postulate and our Self-Reference Postulate: there
can be no infinite chains of membership. If f is a ZF-set, then there always is
an x such that x belongs to f , but there is no intersection between f and x.
Definition 26 ψ is a hyperfunction, and we denote this by H(ψ), iff: (i) σψ 6=
0 ∧ ψ ⊂ 1 ∧ ∃t(ψ[t]); (ii) ∀x(ψ[x] ⇒ (x ⊂ 1 ∧ ψ[σx] ∧ ∃y(ψ[y] ∧ x[y]))); (iii)
∀x(ψ[x]⇒ ∀y((y ⊆ x ∧ y 6= ϕ0 ∧ y 6= 0)⇒ ψ[y])).
Any ψ which satisfies last definition is called a non-well-founded function as
well. Item (ii) entails a violation of Well-Foundedness.
Now, consider another possible postulate to be added to our formal system:
Hyperfunctions ∃ψ(H(ψ)) ∧ ∀f(H(f)⇒ E(f)) ∧ 1
∣∣
∀h(H(h)⇒h[t])
= ϕ0.
Obviously Well-Foundedness and Hyperfunctions are inconsistent with each
other. Thus, we must choose which of them to consider, if we intend to add
new postulates besides F1∼F11.
This last postulate says three things: (i) there is at least one hyperfunction;
(ii) every hyperfunction is emergent; and (iii) there is no common t where all
possible hyperfunctions act. We refer to this last item as the Principle of Non-
Commonality among hyperfunctions. Clearly any hyperfunction ψ acts on an
infinity of terms: if ψ acts on any x, then it acts on σx, as it happens in the
Axiom of Infinity (F7). Nevertheless, inductive functions (Definition 3 states
inductive functions are those who satisfy F7) do not follow any analogue of the
Principle of Non-Commonality. If J is a predicate such that J(i) is equivalent
to ‘i is an inductive function’, then 1
∣∣
∀i(J(i)⇒i[t])
is simply ω, i.e., the unique
function who acts on all ϕn and only on them (the ZF-set of all finite ordinals).
That happens because any inductive function i acts on ϕ0, ϕ1, ϕ2, and so on.
It is worth to remember that any emergent function f 6= ϕ0 acts only on
emergent functions. Thus, for the sake of illustration, let us show a few examples
of hyperfunctions. For that purpose, it is easier to follow next Figure.
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Figure 4: Examples of hyperfunctions.
In the Figure above we suggest the possible existence of infinitely many terms
where a given hyperfunction ψ can act: a, b, c, σa, σb, σc, · · ·, j, k, l, σj , · · ·,
d, e, f , · · ·. We represent this possibility by two ‘big columns’, one to the right
and one to the left, where each ‘big column’ is formed by three ‘little columns’.
Observe, for example, d is a proper restriction of σσa . In such a case, ψ is a
hyperfunction, if for any x we have ψ[x]⇒ ψ(x) = x. Thus we have an infinite
amount of infinite chains of membership relations: · · · b ∈ a ∈ c ∈ b ∈ a ∈ · · ·;
· · · b ∈ a ∈ c ∈ σc ∈ f ∈ σf ∈ σσf ∈ · · ·; · · ·. That corresponds to the
set-theoretic version of violation of the Axiom of Regularity. If we consider a
function ψ′ who acts only on those terms related to a, b, and c (the left ‘big
column’, where we find a, b, c, σa, σb, σc, σσa , σσb , σσc , d, e, f , etc.), ψ
′ is a
hyperfunction as well. The same happens to a function ψ′′ who acts only on
those terms related to j, k, and l (the right ‘big column’). That means there can
be proper restrictions of hyperfunctions who are hyperfunctions. On the other
hand, each small column constitutes a proper restriction of ψ as well. But none
of such restrictions is a hyperfunction. In this simple example we started with
ensembles (‘big columns’) of three terms (a, b, c; j, k, l). But we can obviously
suggest other situations with as many terms as we wish, as long we keep in
mind all properties a hyperfunction is supposed to hold. Nevertheless, there is
no need to assume a hyperfunction is necessarily supposed to be like this. If we
add a term c′ on the left ‘big column’ who acts on both a and j, we still have
a hyperfunction ψ which acts on all terms suggested above (besides c′). And,
in that case, the left ‘big column’ no longer represents a proper restriction of
ψ who is still a hyperfunction. Of course, such a distinction between left and
31
right ‘big column’ is just a pedagogical tool for our illustration purposes, since
there is no clear criterium to distinguish them in the case ψ acts on c′.
All of this helps us to understand the meaning of the Principle of Non-
Commonality 1
∣∣
∀h(H(h)⇒h[t])
= ϕ0 introduced in axiom Hyperfunctions: there
is no common term x where all hyperfunctions act. That means our postulate
Hyperfunctions has no constructive character, in the sense it does not provide
any sufficiently clear criteria for building hyperfunctions. That postulate simply
says there are terms like that. Our axiom of Weak Extensionality (F1) still
holds. But, in general, it is undecidable whether ψ and υ are identical, in the
case both are hyperfunctions. This fact grants the next theorem.
Theorem 54 Any hyperfunction ψ admits an infinite proper restriction ψ′ ⊂ ψ
which can be well-ordered.
Proof According to Theorem 42 (see also the paragraph that follows the proof),
if f : ψ → ϕ1 is a function (observe this is a ‘constant’ function where all
images f(x) have the same value ϕ0), then there is an injection g : ϕ1 → ψ.
Such an injection ‘chooses’ a term x0, according to F11T . Now we can
recursively define a proper restriction ψ′ of ψ as it follows: (i) ψ′(x0) = x0;
(ii) ∀x(ψ′[x] ⇒ ψ′(σx) = σx). Function σ itself defines a well-order over
ψ′.
Last theorem allows us to define a f : ψ′ → ω as it follows: (i) f(x0) = ϕ0;
(ii) ∀x∀y(f(x) = y ⇒ f(σx) = σy). According to Theorem 42, there is an
injection i : ω → ψ′. But such an injection does not preserve the well-order
from ω, since the choice function c : ψ′ → ω obtained from F11 is no restriction
of f . Besides, it is worth to remark such a proper restriction ψ′ of ψ is not a
hyperfunction.
Finally, we introduce the next postulate.
Hyper-ZF-Sets ∀f(H(f)⇒ Z(f)).
Any hyperfunction is a ZF-set (this axiom works together with Definition
10). That means we have a new Grothendieck Universe u = 1
∣∣
Z(t)
which works
as a model of ZF without Regularity, without the Axiom of Choice of ZFC
but with the Partition Principle. In such a model we prove next there are ZF-
sets which cannot be well-ordered. Therefore, the translated Axiom of Choice
from ZFC is not a theorem within our new model, termed F′ (based on axioms
F1∼F11+Hyperfunctions+Hyper-ZF-Sets), while the Partition Principle is a
consequence from our Axiom of F-Choice (Theorem 42). We are not suggesting
the Axiom of Choice in ZFC is somehow related to the Axiom of Regularity.
Actually, it is not. But we chose to work within a non-well-founded version
of ZF for two reasons: (i) to introduce a non-well-founded model of ZF which
cannot be modeled within a von Neumann Universe and, therefore, it is out
of the scope of some metamathematical techniques like Scott’s trick [25] for
determining cardinalities; and (ii) hyperfunctions make it easier for us to prove
our main result.
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Next theoremmakes use of the fact that AC in ZFC is equivalent to Zermelo’s
Theorem (see, e.g., Theorem 5.1 on page 48 of [13]).
Theorem 55 There is at least one ZF-set in F′ that cannot be well-ordered.
Proof Let ψ be a hyperfunction. If ψ can be well-ordered, then we can define an
injection f : ψ → o, where o is an ordinal (see Definition 23 and Theorem
50). Thus, the existence of such a function can be proven by transfinite
induction in the sense of defining it by transfinite recursion. Suppose we
have a surjection f0 : ψ → ϕ1. That can be defined by the next formula:
for all t, ψ[t] ⇒ f0(t) = ϕ0. Theorem 42 (see discussion right after its
proof as well) grants the existence of an injection g0 which acts only on
ϕ0 (the only term where ϕ1 acts), where g0(ϕ0) = x0. Observe x0 is one
of the terms where ψ acts. Observe as well that such an g0 is the inverse
of an injection h0 which acts only on x0 and such that h0(x0) = ϕ0,
according to F11T . It is rather important to observe that both F11T
and F11 do not simply ‘choose’ injections, but also terms where ψ acts.
For the sake of argument (before we simply go to the case of all remaining
ordinals), let us go to the next immediate step of our transfinite induction.
Let f1 : ψ → ϕ2 be a surjective function defined as it follows: for all t,
(f0[t] ⇒ f1(t) = f0(t)) ∧ ((ψ[t] ∧ ¬f0[t])⇒ f1(t) = ϕ1). In that case f1 is
once again a surjection. But now this new surjection takes x0 into ϕ0 and
all remaining terms t where ψ acts into ϕ1. Nevertheless, F11 grants us
the existence of an injection h1 whose F-domain is a restriction of ψ, whose
F-image is ϕ2, but such that h1 is not a restriction of f1. So, now we have
h1(y0) = ϕ0 and h1(y1) = ϕ1, where y0 and y1 are terms where ψ acts
(and ϕ0 and ϕ1 are terms where ϕ2 acts) but with no guarantee that either
one of them is x0. Actually, in this second step, we do have the guarantee
that h1(x0) 6= ϕ0 (h1(x0) could be even 0 for all that matters). Function
g1, the inverse of h1, is the injection demanded by the Partition Principle
in Theorem 42. Consequently, g0 is no restriction of g1. Thus, we have
failed in fixing x0 (associating it to ϕ0) in order to fix a next term where ψ
acts and associate it to the next ordinal ϕ1. At each step of our induction
we have new terms associated to ϕ0, ϕ1, and so on, with the guarantee
that at least one of them is not fixed to the same ordinal in the previous
steps. Suppose now we reach the first limit ordinal ω in our already failed
transfinite induction. Then we have a surjection fω : ψ → σω such that
fω(z0) = ϕ0, fω(z1) = ϕ1, and so on, and for all the remaining terms t
where ψ acts we have fω(t) = ω, where z0, z1, and so on, are pairwise
distinct terms where ψ acts, but with no relationship whatsoever with the
terms chosen by F11 in the previous steps for ordinals o such that ω[o]
(those o who are strictly lesser than ω). In the next immediate step of our
induction a whole new plethora of terms w0, w1, · · ·, wω , will be chosen by
F11, meaning we have no halting criterium to stop induction for the case
when all terms of ψ are exhausted. So, it is not possible to prove there is
an injection between ψ and an ordinal o by transfinite induction, in the
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sense of fixing an injection f : ψ → o for some ordinal o (through a process
of transfinite recursion that is supposed to define f), specially when we
already know that a hyperfunction can be ‘bigger’ than ω (Theorem 54).
Finally, since we have no criterium for establishing a surjection with F-
domain o and F-image ψ (in order to try another way of using F11; but
even if we had such a criterium, we would still face the same problems
pointed above), that concludes our proof.
A similar proof of last theorem can be carried out by assuming any uncount-
able set like, e.g., the set of real numbers instead of a hyperfunction ψ.
If F11 demanded the chosen function c to be a restriction of the surjection
f , our new axiom of F-Choice F11’ could be easily used to prove any ZF-set
(including hyperfunctions) can be well-ordered, and such a proof can be done
by transfinite induction, in a similar way to Zermelo’s Theorem. The idea is as
follows. Let x be a ZF-set and f0 : x → ϕ1 be given by ∀t(x[t] ⇒ f0(t) = ϕ0).
Theorem 42 (adapted to the new F11’) grants a g0 such that g(x0) = ϕ0, where
x0 is a term such that x[x0]. For the next immediate step we define a function
f1 : x → ϕ2 as ∀t((f0[t] ⇒ f1(t) = f0(t)) ∧ ((x[t] ∧ ¬f0[t]) ⇒ f1(t) = ϕ1)).
Theorem 42 (adapted to the new F11’) grants a g1 such that g1(x0) = ϕ0
and g1(x1) = ϕ1, since our new proposed chosen function c is a restriction
of f1. For the remaining steps, let κ be an ordinal (Definition 23). Then we
can define a function fκ : x → σκ such that ∀λ∀t(κ[λ] ⇒ (fλ[t] ⇒ fκ(t) =
fλ(t)) ∧ ((x[t] ∧ ¬fλ[t])⇒ fκ(t) = κ)). Theorem 42 (adapted to the new F11’)
grants the existence of a gκ such that gκ(xn) = n for any ordinal n such that
σκ[n]. We repeat the process until all terms where x acts are exhausted. That
is a recursive definition for a well order on x.
Thus, the issue here is the condition in F11 that the choice function c is no
restriction of f . F11 is strong enough to grant PP, but too weak to entail AC.
5 Final remarks
As a reference to Heraclitus’s flux doctrine, we are inclined to refer to all terms of
Flow as fluents , rather than functions. In this sense Flow is a theory of fluents .
That is also an auspicious homage to the Method of Fluxions by Isaac Newton
[22]. The famous ‘natural philosopher’ referred to functions as fluents, and their
derivatives as fluxions . Whether Newton was inspired or not by Heraclitus,
that is historically uncertain ([27], page 38). Notwithstanding, we find such a
coincidence quite inspiring and utterly opportune.
From the mathematical point of view, our framework was strongly motivated
by von Neumann’s set theory [31], as we briefly discussed in the Introduction.
But what are the main differences between Flow and von Neumann’s ideas?
We refer to von Neumann’s set theory as N. The first important difference
lurks in the way how von Neumann seemed to understand functions: “a func-
tion can be regarded as a set of pairs, and a set as a function that can take
two values... the two notions are completely equivalent”. That philosophical
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viewpoint seems to be committed to a set-theoretic framework. Here we follow
a different path: i) In N there are two privileged objects termed A and B which
resemble our terms 0 and 1. Nevertheless, in N there is no further information
about A and B. Besides, those constants play a different role of 0 and 1 in F,
as we can see in the next item. ii) In N there are two sorts of objects, namely,
arguments and functions. Eventually some of those objects are both of them.
And when an object f is an argument and a function, which takes only values
A and B, then f is a set. Our terms 0 and 1 have no similar role. Besides, we
do not need to distinguish functions from any other kind of term. All objects
of F are functions. iii) Von Neumann believed a distinction between arguments
and functions was necessary to avoid the well known antinomies from naive set
theory. Nevertheless, we proved a simple axiom of self-reference (F2) is enough
to avoid such a problem. iv) The distinction between sets and other collections
which are ‘too big’ to be sets depends on considerations if a specific term in
N is both an argument and a function. Within F that distinction depends on
considerations regarding F-successor. v) Axiom I4 of N ([31], page 399) says
any function can be identified by its images. Our weak extensionality F1 allows
us to derive a similar result as a non-trivial theorem (Theorem 1). vi) One
primitive concept in N is a binary functional letter (using modern terminology)
which allows to define ordered pairs. In F that assumption is unnecessary. vii)
In N there are many constant functions ([31], page 399, axiom II2). In F there
are only two constant functions, namely, 0 and ϕ0. viii) In N the well-ordering
theorem and the axiom of choice are consequences of its postulates. In F such
a phenomenon does not take place.
Although we did not use F-composition to obtain our main result, we in-
troduced that concept to deliver a partial response to the unavoidable question
about how to ‘compose’ functions in Flow. But other proposals for ‘composition’
may be introduced. A simple example refers to what we call Z-composition: f
and g can be Z-composed iff DomFf , Dom
F
g , Im
F
f , and Im
F
g act only on ZF-sets,
and DomFg = Im
F
f , and f and g do not act on each other. The Z-composition
h = g◦Zf is defined as h(t) = g(f(t)) for any t where f acts. It is easy to show Z-
composition is associative. In a sense, F-composition generalizes Z-composition.
We intend to study other possibilities for ‘composition’ in forthcoming papers.
Other open problems refer to how precisely Flow is related to Lambda Cal-
culus [3], Category Theory [9] [17], String Diagrams [7], and Autocategories
[8].
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